Integration-vs-Segregation

 

Pakistan’s Federation: Integration, Inclusion and the Growing Need to Address Grievances

An analysis from my 17 years of observing Pakistan’s grassroots and constitutional issues

I have spent many years observing Pakistan’s geography, communities, political developments and the grievances that emerge at the grassroots level. From this experience, I believe that the real challenge before Pakistan is not simply a dispute between one political party and another, or between one province and another.

The larger question is whether our constitutional system is sufficiently capable of absorbing disagreements, resolving grievances and maintaining confidence among all federating units.

My purpose in writing this analysis is therefore not to support or oppose any political party, province or individual. I want to examine the issue from the perspective of federal integration versus growing feelings of exclusion.

In my view, disagreement is not itself dangerous for a federation. What becomes dangerous is when legitimate grievances remain unresolved for a long period and people begin to believe that constitutional institutions cannot provide them with a fair mechanism for resolution.

What is verified and what is allegation?

Before reaching any conclusion, I believe it is essential to separate established facts from political claims.

Pakistan's Constitution establishes the Council of Common Interests (CCI). Article 153 provides for the Prime Minister as chairman, the four Chief Ministers and three members of the Federal Government nominated by the Prime Minister. Therefore, the Constitution does not allocate the three federal seats to Punjab or to any other province. Federal nominees represent the Federation.

This distinction is important because I do not consider it constitutionally accurate to describe the CCI as having “five Punjab members” simply because the Prime Minister, federal nominees and a provincial Chief Minister may at a particular time be politically associated with Punjab.

However, I do believe there can be a perception of concentration of power if the federal members and the Chief Minister of the same province happen to have strong political association with one another. My concern here is therefore about institutional confidence, not about assigning constitutional ownership of federal members to a province.

The same principle applies to disputes concerning water and hydropower.

The Water Apportionment Accord was signed by the provinces on 16 March 1991 and approved by the CCI on 21 March 1991. IRSA was subsequently established under the IRSA Act 1992 to regulate and monitor the distribution of Indus River waters among the provinces.

These are established institutional facts.

On the other hand, individual political claims about whether a particular province has been deprived of its constitutional share, whether a government has deliberately obstructed another province, or whether a political action was motivated by provincial discrimination should not automatically be treated as proven facts. Such claims require documentary, judicial or independent verification.

Why I see the present situation as a federal issue

My analysis is that Pakistan's present political tensions should not be examined only through the lens of Islamabad politics.

For example, the planned PTI protest for 27 September 2026 and the litigation surrounding it are documented political events. The Islamabad High Court dealt with a petition concerning the proposed protest and emphasized that fundamental rights must be balanced with the rights of other citizens, including freedom of movement.

The PTI's stated political objectives and the government's or courts' responses can be debated separately.

But I see a larger question underneath this confrontation:

Are Pakistan's political disagreements being processed through institutions in a way that strengthens confidence in the federation, or are unresolved disputes gradually becoming provincial and social identities?

This is where, in my view, the matter becomes much bigger than PTI, PML-N, PPP or any other political organization.

The KP hydropower question needs transparent verification

A recent example illustrates why transparent institutional mechanisms are necessary.

The KP Chief Minister's adviser on finance publicly claimed that KP produced around 70 percent of hydel power while Punjab produced around 30 percent, and alleged that KP received Rs71.5 billion in net hydel profit against Rs177.7 billion paid to Punjab during 2024–2026. These figures and the constitutional interpretation attached to them are claims made by the KP government side, not facts that I would present as independently established without an appropriate audit or official reconciliation.

For me, the important question is therefore not simply whether one side's number is correct.

The important question is:

Why should a constitutional resource dispute remain capable of becoming a political grievance without a publicly understandable mechanism that verifies the figures and resolves the disagreement?

If the claim is wrong, it should be transparently disproved with official data.

If the claim is correct, the constitutional entitlement should be addressed.

Either way, uncertainty itself damages public confidence.

My proposed improvement to the CCI

This is where I would like to put forward my own suggestion.

I am not saying that the Constitution currently requires federal CCI members to come from particular provinces. It does not.

My suggestion is a possible institutional convention or reform for consideration:

If the Prime Minister belongs politically to one province, the three federal members nominated to the CCI should, as far as practicable, be selected from the other three provinces, with one representative associated with each province.

I see this as a way of improving geographical diversity and confidence in the institution.

The purpose would not be to create four competing provincial representatives inside the Federal Government. The federal members would still represent the Federation.

Rather, the objective would be to ensure that when questions involving provincial resources, water, electricity, transport or constitutional rights come before the CCI, the composition of the institution visibly reflects Pakistan's federal diversity.

If such a requirement were to become legally binding, its compatibility with Article 153 and the wider constitutional framework would need proper legal examination. I am presenting this as my proposed reform, not as an existing constitutional rule.

Water is not merely an economic question

I also believe that water disputes require particular attention.

The 1991 Water Accord already provides a constitutional-political framework for distributing Indus waters, while IRSA was established to implement and regulate that framework. The Ministry of Water Resources itself describes the Accord as the accepted basis for provincial water allocation and recognizes IRSA's role in implementing it.

Therefore, whenever a province believes that its water share is being affected, the solution should not be allowed to become a permanent political confrontation.

There should be:

• transparent water data;
• publicly understandable distribution records;
• independent technical verification;
• timely resolution of provincial objections;
• effective use of the CCI and IRSA mechanisms; and
• parliamentary accountability where necessary.

In my opinion, a federation becomes stronger when its disputes are measurable and institutionally resolvable.

My concern about the direction of provincial grievances

I do not believe that every provincial grievance is necessarily justified merely because it is expressed loudly.

At the same time, I do not believe that every grievance should be dismissed as political propaganda.

This distinction is extremely important.

A grievance should first be recorded.

Then it should be verified.

Then the responsible constitutional institution should respond.

If the grievance is proved wrong, the evidence should be made clear.

If it is proved correct, corrective action should follow.

And if the matter remains disputed, both sides should have access to an impartial mechanism.

This, in my view, would create a federal early-warning system before disagreements develop into permanent alienation.

Integration does not mean silence

From my perspective, national integration does not mean that every province must remain silent about its problems.

Punjab can raise its concerns.

KP can raise its concerns.

Sindh can raise its concerns.

Balochistan can raise its concerns.

Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir can also raise their constitutional and developmental concerns within their respective frameworks.

The real test of the federation is not whether disagreements exist.

The real test is whether the system can resolve those disagreements without allowing them to become hatred between communities.

I therefore do not see this discussion as “Punjab versus KP”, “Sindh versus Punjab” or “one party versus another”.

I see it as a question of whether Pakistan's constitutional institutions are sufficiently trusted by ordinary citizens across geographical boundaries.

A SWOT view from my perspective

Strengths

Pakistan already possesses important federal mechanisms: Parliament, provincial governments, the CCI, IRSA, the courts and constitutional procedures.

The existence of the 1991 Water Accord and IRSA demonstrates that interprovincial disputes can be addressed through agreed institutional arrangements.

Weaknesses

In my assessment, the weakness appears when constitutional mechanisms do not produce timely, transparent and publicly understandable answers.

Long-running disputes can then become political narratives.

Opportunities

Pakistan can strengthen the federation through:

1. transparent CCI proceedings;
2. regular publication of interprovincial dispute data;
3. independent verification of resource claims;
4. stronger institutional coordination between CCI, IRSA and relevant ministries;
5. greater geographical diversity in federal institutional appointments;
6. a formal grievance-monitoring mechanism; and
7. parliamentary review of unresolved interprovincial disputes.

Threats

My greatest concern is that an economic or constitutional grievance can gradually become a provincial identity.

Once people begin to interpret every national decision through the question of “which province benefits and which province loses”, ordinary constitutional disagreement can become much more difficult to manage.

That is the stage Pakistan should try to prevent.

My conclusion

After observing these issues for many years, my conclusion is that Pakistan does not need fewer disagreements; it needs better mechanisms for handling disagreements.

A federation cannot be strengthened by simply telling its citizens that everything is fine.

Nor can it be strengthened by treating every political allegation as established truth.

The better approach, in my view, is to establish a clear distinction between fact, allegation, grievance and analysis.

Facts should be verified.

Allegations should be investigated.

Genuine grievances should be addressed.

And political disagreements should remain within constitutional institutions.

My proposed CCI composition principle is one example of the type of reform I believe deserves discussion: greater geographical diversity in federal nominations while maintaining the federal character of those representatives.

Ultimately, my concern is not about protecting one political party or one province.

My concern is protecting the confidence of ordinary Pakistanis in the idea that the Federation belongs equally to them.

For me, integration does not mean the absence of provincial voices.

Integration means that every provincial voice has a constitutional place from which it can be heard, verified and answered.