Pakistan’s-Rule-of-Law-Under-Scrutiny

 

Justice, Police Accountability and Judicial Independence

By Muhammad Israr

Introduction: The Dangerous Distance Between Authority and Justice

A state is not judged merely by its ability to arrest suspects, control protests or exercise administrative power. Its real strength lies in protecting citizens while ensuring that public institutions remain accountable to law.

When police operations appear to replace judicial proceedings, political leaders defend questionable conduct by their own machinery, or judicial independence becomes controversial, a fundamental question arises: Is the state strengthening the rule of law, or concentrating power at the expense of justice?

Pakistan faces this question amid debate over public confidence, constitutional governance and institutional accountability. The issue is not whether criminals should be punished. They must be held accountable when guilt is established through lawful proceedings. The issue is whether the state may bypass the institutions responsible for determining guilt and delivering justice.

History suggests that concentrated power can produce short-term control while creating lasting political, social and institutional consequences.

1. The Punjab CCD Case: Can an Encounter Replace a Trial?

The recent Multan case involving a teenage boy and the subsequent death of a suspect in an alleged Crime Control Department (CCD) encounter in Bahawalpur deserves independent scrutiny.

According to Dawn, the suspect accused of fatally injuring the boy had been arrested and presented before a judicial magistrate, who granted three days of physical remand. Police later claimed that he escaped custody and was killed during an exchange of fire in Bahawalpur. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan called for an independent, transparent investigation. These circumstances demand answers, but the official account and unanswered questions must not be confused with a final finding of criminal responsibility.

The central questions are straightforward: Why did a case already before a court end with the suspect’s death before trial? How did the alleged escape occur? What evidence supports the police account? Were custody records, forensic evidence, surveillance footage and officers’ conduct independently examined?

These are matters for investigators and courts. No explanation should be treated as established without evidence.

The same scrutiny must apply to officials. Were government or security officials involved in issuing, encouraging or implementing an unlawful order? Has weakened judicial oversight created an environment in which officials believe they can act without meaningful review? These are questions of institutional responsibility, not conclusions of guilt.

Such questions do not excuse the child’s death or minimise the original allegations. They concern the state’s duty to deliver justice lawfully.

The HRCP’s February 2026 fact-finding report raised broader concerns about CCD operations, documenting 670 encounters and 924 suspect deaths over eight months in 2025, based on reports it reviewed. It called for a high-level judicial inquiry. These figures are findings attributed to a human-rights organisation, not a judicial determination that every reported encounter was unlawful.

If the state has sufficient evidence against a suspect, it should present that evidence in court. If an encounter was lawful, an independent investigation should establish its circumstances. If an officer violated the law, that officer should face accountability.

The government cannot build lasting public confidence by treating an encounter as a substitute for a judicial verdict.

2. Who Controls the State’s Machinery?

A provincial chief executive must maintain public order and improve law enforcement. Specialised police departments may be necessary to address organised crime. Neither political authority nor operational necessity, however, creates unlimited power to punish.

Police investigate offences, prosecutors present cases, and courts determine criminal responsibility. These functions must remain distinct.

If a chief executive praises an operation before the facts are independently established, the public may reasonably question whether political considerations influence accountability. That does not prove that a political order was issued or that an officer acted illegally; those questions require evidence.

The same standard applies to an SHO, senior police officer, departmental head or political officeholder.

The legitimacy of state power depends not only on who gives an order, but also on whether it is lawful and can withstand independent scrutiny.

When officials justify allegedly unlawful conduct because its outcome seems desirable, the danger extends beyond one case. A system that rewards results without examining methods risks making accountability a matter of political convenience.

3. Pakistan’s Constitutional Amendments and Judicial Independence

The 26th Constitutional Amendment, enacted in October 2024, and the 27th Amendment, enacted in November 2025, altered Pakistan’s judicial framework.

The 26th changed judicial appointments, selection of the chief justice and aspects of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. The 27th established a Federal Constitutional Court and transferred important constitutional functions to it. Both generated disagreement over the balance between parliamentary authority and judicial independence.

The International Commission of Jurists criticised the amendments, arguing that they increased political influence over the judiciary and weakened its ability to hold the executive accountable. Amnesty International also raised concerns about the 27th Amendment. These are significant assessments by human-rights organisations, but they are not equivalent to a final judicial ruling that the amendments are invalid.

A parliamentary amendment is not automatically unlawful because it is controversial. Nor should parliamentary approval end debate about its constitutional consequences.

The relevant questions are whether required procedures were followed, legislators had a meaningful opportunity to consider the proposals, constitutional safeguards were respected and the resulting structure preserves independent adjudication.

Critics questioned the speed and manner of passage, particularly the 26th Amendment, approved during an extraordinary overnight session. The government and its supporters defended the changes as within Parliament’s authority.

The distinction matters: a disputed legislative process, a contested constitutional interpretation and a legally invalid amendment are three different claims. Each must be assessed on its evidence and legal merits.

If citizens believe the judiciary has become dependent on the political authorities it must scrutinise, constitutional legitimacy may suffer. An independent judiciary does not place judges above accountability; it requires decisions to be governed by law and evidence rather than political instructions.

4. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: A Historical Lesson Pakistan Cannot Ignore

Pakistan’s history illustrates the enduring relationship between political power and judicial legitimacy.

Former prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was convicted in a murder case and executed in 1979 under General Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime. In March 2024, more than four decades later, a nine-member Supreme Court bench concluded that the proceedings had not met fair-trial and due-process requirements. The advisory opinion did not overturn the final judgment but acknowledged serious failures.

The case shows that even a final judicial decision may remain subject to constitutional and historical reassessment.

This does not mean every controversial verdict is politically directed, nor should Bhutto’s case be equated directly with the CCD incident. The facts and legal contexts differ. The broader lesson is that institutions cannot preserve legitimacy merely by invoking authority; their conduct must satisfy fairness, due process and impartiality.

When judicial processes are compromised, the damage may outlast the officials responsible. Future generations may be left to examine the record, acknowledge mistakes and attempt to restore trust.

5. What Happened Under Dictatorships Around the World?

World history offers examples of governments that concentrated power, restricted institutional independence and justified coercion in the name of security or public order.

Chile under Augusto Pinochet

After the 1973 military coup, General Augusto Pinochet led a regime associated with repression, killings, disappearances and torture. These abuses were later documented by human-rights organisations, while Chile faced a prolonged struggle over accountability.

Pinochet lost the 1988 plebiscite on whether he should remain president. Chile moved towards elected civilian government, which took office in 1990, but his departure did not immediately end his influence or resolve accountability.

In 1998, British authorities arrested him following an international legal request concerning alleged human-rights crimes. He was eventually returned to Chile on medical grounds, but the case helped revive domestic proceedings and challenged the assumption that a former ruler could remain beyond the law.

Chile suggests that authoritarian power may delay accountability without guaranteeing permanent immunity. Electoral opposition, civil society, judicial action and international scrutiny can gradually alter the balance of power.

Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines

Ferdinand Marcos’s rule offers another example of concentrated executive power and weakened democratic safeguards.

After imposing martial law in 1972, Marcos governed through an increasingly centralised system that restricted opposition, civil liberties and political competition. Economic difficulties, corruption allegations and the 1983 assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino Jr. intensified public opposition.

In February 1986, a disputed election was followed by the People Power movement, which helped end Marcos’s rule. He left the Philippines and went into exile.

The episode illustrates how an administration may retain formal power while losing public confidence. Once that gap becomes sufficiently wide, a political system may face a crisis its institutions cannot contain. Coercive authority and political survival are not the same thing.

The Wider Historical Pattern

These examples do not prove that every government accused of institutional interference will collapse. Outcomes depend on economic conditions, political organisation, civil society, institutional cohesion and leaders’ willingness to accept lawful limits.

They do offer a warning: concentrated power may protect those in office temporarily, but it cannot by itself create durable legitimacy.

The more a system relies on coercion instead of accountable institutions, the harder it may become to resolve disputes peacefully.

6. Do Catastrophic Events Produce Further Social Harm?

Wars, economic collapse, displacement, repression and institutional crises can leave deep social wounds. People who experience injustice, insecurity or lost livelihoods may suffer frustration, distrust and a reduced sense of belonging.

When communities believe peaceful remedies are unavailable, tensions may become harder to manage. Yet catastrophe does not inevitably produce crime, and most people facing hardship do not become violent.

A more defensible argument is that severe disruption can increase certain risks when combined with poverty, weak institutions, impunity, exclusion and ineffective grievance mechanisms.

This is why public institutions matter. Fair courts provide lawful routes for resolving disputes. Credible police protect citizens without arbitrary discrimination. Transparent political systems offer peaceful means to challenge decisions.

When these channels function, they may reduce the risk that grievances become prolonged conflict. When they fail, people may see law as an instrument of the powerful rather than a protection available to all.

The state should treat public frustration as a warning that governance requires attention, not as a justification for greater coercion.

7. The Danger of Normalising Extrajudicial Punishment

A serious risk arises when people welcome a suspect’s death simply because they believe the person deserved punishment.

Public anger may be understandable after a child is killed or a violent crime shocks a community. The state’s responsibility, however, differs from the public’s immediate emotional response.

If a suspect is killed before trial, and the death did not result from lawful use of force, the judicial process loses the opportunity to test evidence, establish the circumstances, examine other suspects and deliver a reasoned verdict. The victim’s family may also lose the chance to hear a complete account through court proceedings.

If an encounter becomes a shortcut to justice, important questions may remain unanswered. Tolerating allegedly unlawful conduct against an unpopular suspect also creates a precedent that may later be used against an innocent, politically vulnerable or falsely accused person.

This is the danger of selective legality: protection under law begins to depend on whom authorities choose to protect.

A state committed to justice must resist that temptation.

8. What Should Pakistan Learn from History?

Pakistan needs law enforcement that is firm against crime and equally firm against unlawful public authority.

First, deaths during police operations should be independently investigated whenever credible questions arise. Evidence should be preserved, and findings made public to the extent permitted by law.

Second, political leaders should avoid declaring guilt or celebrating operations before facts are established. Public statements should reinforce lawful accountability rather than pressure investigators.

Third, constitutional reforms affecting the judiciary should undergo transparent parliamentary debate, meaningful public consultation and independent legal scrutiny. Reform should strengthen courts, not expose them to improper influence.

Fourth, allegations of misconduct should be investigated regardless of rank, affiliation or institutional position. The same standards must apply to police officers, elected representatives and other officials.

Finally, the state should invest in effective investigations, professional prosecution, witness protection and timely trials. These offer a more sustainable response to crime than force alone.

The objective is not to weaken police or deny government its lawful authority, but to ensure that authority remains legitimate.

Conclusion: The State Must Not Become Its Own Court

Pakistan’s constitutional history, the Bhutto case, controversy over judicial reforms and questions surrounding CCD operations point to one principle: state power must remain answerable to law.

The executive cannot replace the judiciary. Police cannot independently determine guilt. Parliament’s constitutional authority is not unlimited, and judicial independence is not immunity from accountability.

World history offers the same warning. Governments that rely excessively on coercion may secure temporary compliance, but public confidence requires fairness, transparency and restraint. Ignored abuses can damage social trust and make peaceful conflict resolution more difficult.

The death of a child demands justice. Law-enforcement conduct demands accountability when credible questions arise. Constitutional changes require scrutiny when they affect judicial independence.

None of these responsibilities cancels out the others.

A strong state does not prove its strength by acting without restraint. It proves it by showing that even powerful institutions must obey the law.

Justice is not the enemy of effective governance. It is its foundation.

Author’s Disclaimer

This article is an independent political and constitutional analysis written by Muhammad Israr. It draws on publicly reported events, historical examples and published assessments by human-rights organisations. It distinguishes official claims, allegations, institutional criticism and established judicial findings. It does not declare any individual guilty of an offence or assert that a particular official issued an unlawful order without verified evidence. The author supports lawful investigations, fair trials, institutional accountability and the equal application of the law to all citizens and public officeholders.

— Muhammad Israr